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On the Causes of, and Circumstances, attending, the Explosion 
which occurred at Harringtoll No. 10 Colliery , Lowca, 
Cumberland, on 9th December, 1946 
THE RT. HON. EMANUEL SI-IlNWELL, M.P., 
Minister of Fuel and Power 
SIR, 
9th September, 1947 
On 20th December, 1946, you directed that in pursuance of Section 83 of the 
Coal Mines Act, 191I, a formal Investigation should be held into the causes 
and circumstances of the explosion which occurred in the Main Band Seam of 
the Hanington No. IQ Mine, Lowca, Cumberland, on the 9th December, 1946, 
and appointed me as Commissioner to hold the Investigation. 
Having held the Investigation in accordance with these directions I now have 
the honour to report thereon. 
By arrangement with Lieutenant-Colonel D. J. ,Iason, 0.5.0., T.D., D.L., 
H.l\1. Coroner for \Vest Cumberland, the Inquiry was held concurrently with 
the adjourned Inquest in The Congregational Church Schoolrooms, \Vhitehaven, 
commencing on 25th February and terminating on 1St March, 1947, at which 
thirty-two \v;tnesses gave evidence. 
The appearances were as follows :-
Mr. A. Stoker, H.M. Divisional Inspector of MineS } For the Ministry 
Mr. G. M. Harvey, 1-1.1\1. Electrical Inspector of Mines of Fuel and 
Mr. P. G. Dominy, H.M. District Inspector of Mines Power 
Mr. Paul E. Sandlands, K.C, . . . . .. } For the United 
Mr. G. R. Swanwick (Instructed by Messrs. Steel Companies 
Brockbank, Helder and Orrnrod). . . . . . Ltd. 
Mr. \V. E. Jones . . } for the National Union Mr. E. Moore . . 
of Mineworkers Mr. R. Young .. 
Mr. Tom Stephenson for the Cumberland Miners' Association 
Mr. Barth \Valsh } for the National Association 
Mr. Harry Skerry of Colliery Overmen, Deputies 
Mr. John W. Foster . . and Shotfirers 
�Ir. \V. Unsworth for the National Association 
Mr. A. B. Dawson of Colliery Managers 
Mr. \V. F. Richardson for the National 
Mr. R. Crawford . . Coal Board 
A list of the witnesses is given in Appendi-x I and a list of the persons killed 
and injured in Appendix H. 
My thanks are due to Colonel Mason for so cordially agreeing to the Jomt 
Inquiry and for his helpful co-operation; also to the representatives of the 
various parties, including the Colliery Surveyor, who contributed to the efficient 
and smooth running of the proceedings, and to Mr. H. Offord who acted as Clerk 
of the Court. 
At the conclusion of the evidence the Coroner swnmed up at some length 
and recorded his verdict that the cause of death in each case was due to the 
result of an explosion of gas on 9th December, 1946, and that the men met 
their deaths by misadventure. 
4 
• 
I-DESCRIPTION OF THE COLLIERY 
The Harrington No. 10 Colliery (at the time of the explosion belonging to 
the United Steel Companies Ltd.) is situated at Lowca Village about six miles 
from \Vorkington and three miles from \Vhitchavcn. The shafts known as 
No. 10 (downcast) and No. 9 (upeast) and of 20 feet and 16 feet diameter 
respectively, are sunk on high ground within a few hundred yards of the sea 
under which are most of the workings. The pit bottom is in the Six Quarters 
Seam at a depth of 648 feet from the surface. and the Main Band Seam at the 
shafts lies at a depth of 350 feet. 
The colliery output which was 5,000 tons per week in 1938 fell to 2.300 tons 
in 1943 and rose to about 3,000 tons per week in December 1946. 
In 1946, altogether 770 persons were employed; 240 (of whom 30 were 
women) were employed on the surface; 195 were engaged at the coal face and 
335 as haulage and oncost workers. The average number employed under­
ground on the day shift was 250, but on the day of the explosion there were 
208 at work of whom 53 were in the .Main Band Seam, the seam in which the 
explosion occurred. 
:'Ilr. J. A. Nimmo was the General Mining Manager of the Company's Cumber­
land collieries, Mr. T. J. Hughes was the Agent, and Mr. Frank Graham the 
manager of the Harrington Colliery. At the date of the explosion Mr. John 
McCracken was the wldermanager, having been transferred three months before 
from a similar position at No. 5 pit owing to the illness of the regular under­
manager. 
Supervision in the No. 2 district of the Main Band Seam was by two overmen 
(day and afternoon) and by one deputy on each shift. 
The Alaiu Baud Seam, which is O\"erlain by a thick sandstone roof, has a 
total thickness of 12 feet of coal and thin dirt partings, but the roof coal (2! 
feet thick) is not worked; the floor is of fireclay and then a thick hard shale. 
In this seam four units or districts were being worked, entered from the 
Main Band engine plane which starts at the Lickbank Junction off the North 
Plane haulage road at It miles from the shaft and runs west for about a mile. 
At this point mechanised mining was begun in 1943 in an endeavour to 
increase output, four parallel levels (numbered I to 4) being started off the 
Main Band engine plane as development roads and advanced by Joy Loaders 
and a M. & c. Arc Shearer. Later a trunk belt conveyor was installed in Xo. 
3 level and also chain conveyors. Auxiliary fans were then introduced to 
ventilate the levels. . 
From these levels the No. 2 district, in which the explosion occurred, was 
opened out by five headings at right angles to the levels as shown on Plans 
Nos. I and 2, these headings being commenced in November 1944; shuttle 
cars were then introduced. The headings were dl·iven at 50 feet centres, with 
thirlings at ISO feet, and were 15 feet wide by 10 feet high. As the headings 
ldvanced pillar workings were opened out to the left (later known as the shuttle 
·ar section), but the shuttle cars were withdrawn and this section abandoned 
short time prior to the explosi�n, and supports were being withdrawn from it. 
The area comprising the No. 2 district was very wet, water raining from the 
roof in the headings, and it was decided to advance the Nos. 2 and 3 headings 
(which were rising at about I in 18) rapidly to the boundary-fixed by a limiting 
minimum cover of 240 feet-so as to drain the water from the area, Duckbill 
loaders with Goodman shortwaU coalcutters and Victor drills for simultaneous 
shotfiIing being installed. These headings were reduced to a height of 6 to 7 
feet at a point about midway between Nos. 5 and 6 left thirls, and continued at 
that height, the rate of advance being about 40 yards per month. 
J 
�O. I heading was stopped at No. 4 left thirl, and No. 5 heading having 
struck a fault was discontinued, the intention being to dri\'c b.1.ck from the No. 5 
right thirl to establish a connection. 
�o. 3 heading was the haulage road and intake airway in which was installed 
a belt conveyor fed by a scraper chain conveyor in No. 6 left thirl between Nos. 
2 and 3 headings and a similar conveyor in No. 5 right thirl. 
At the date of the explosion Nos. 2 and 3 headings were some 40 yards in 
ad\'ance of the last (No. 7) thid, these workings being about 3 miles distant 
from the shafts. 
\Vhen no longer in use the thirls were sealed off by corrugated sheeting 
covered by brattice cloth. The undermanager said there was a shortage both 
of bricks and bricklayers and that was the reason brick stoppings had not been 
erected, but he considered the corrugated sheeting efficient. 
l-mlilaliou, was produced by a Capell double inlet fan, electrically driven, 
situated at Xo. 9 shaft with a capacity of 200,000 cubic feet per minute at a 
water gauge of 8 inches. On the Xorth side of the pit the North Plane haulage 
road (in the Si.x Quarter Seam) is the main intake; at the Lickbank Junction 
about I! miles from the shaft the air splits, that to the Main Band seam going 
west by way of the Main Band Engine Plane. From this separate splits are 
taken to the No. 4. No. 3 and then the No. 2 units, the remainder passing 
further in bye to ventilate the No. I unit. 
The total quantity entcring the North Plane as measured on 7th November. 
19-16, was 61,870 cubic feet per minute. The quantity entering the Main Band 
on the same date was 41,750 cubic feet. No measurements of the quantitie3 
in the separate splits in the Main Band were recorded in the statutory Air 
.Measurements Book (M. & Q. No. 37). but readings for No. 2 District taken 
from a notebook showed 17,017. 16,744 and 17,876 cubic feet per minute for 
September, October and November, 19-16, respectively. 
Plan No. 2 shows the system of ventilation in the No. 2 unit, the district in 
which the explosion occurred. It will be seen that three auxiliary fans were in 
use. aU of them electrically driven. 
�o. I fan fixed in No. 2 road was of the "Aerex" type (made by 
\\Talker Bros.) 19 inches diameter, driven by six half-inch belts (only four in 
use) with a total capacity of 8,750 cubic feet per minute. Adjustable louvres 
were fitted on the intake end for air regulation. This fan had approximately 
300 feet of 24 inches diameter Meeo canvas tubing attached to it for ventilating 
part of the old shuttle car section of workings recently abandoned and being 
drawn off. 
No. 2 fan fixed in No. 3 road was of the" Aeroto " screw type (made by 
Davidson & Co.) direct driven at a motor spced of 2,900 Lp.m. Capacity 
5.000 cubic feet per minute with 540 feet of tubing 2-1 inches diameter. Used 
for ventilating No. 4 heading and the No. 5 thirl extension. No. 3 fan also in 
Ko. 3 road was a duplicate of No. I and was used for ventilating Nos. 2 and 3 
headings. 
All the auxiliary fans were kept running continuously when men were at 
work in the area they served. Nonnally Nos. 2 and 3 ran constantly from 
Sunday midnight until about mid-day on the following Saturday. They were 
re-started on the Sunday morning at about 6.45 and run for some 5 or 6 hours­
u�ually the maintenance engineers were on duty during this period-after 
which they again stood until re-started by the night shift deputy before making 
his pre-shift examination for the Monday morning shift. 
No measurements were at any time taken of the quantity of air circulated by 
these fans, and for the reason stated later in this report the quantity in the 
intake at roo yards from the working face was not measured as required by 
":;eneral Regulations. 
Firedclmp.-The Main Band seam is regarded as a fairly gassy one. During 
the six months preceding the explosion the statutory reports showed the 
presence of firedamp in No. 2 district to have been reported as foHows :-
04lh June-Afternoon shift inspection from 8.15 to 9.45 p.m. "None 
except No. 2 and No. 4 High Side off �o. 4 Slope. Auxiliary fan out of order 
2! per cent. gas present." 
71h Jllne-Afternoon shift inspection (during shift). "None except 2t per 
cent. gas in No. 4 High Side off No. 4 Slope. Re-arranging ventilation tubes." 
These were both in the shuttle car section of workings. 
During the period 28th June to 26th August there were eleven reports missing. 
8th October-F irst shift inspection 12.15 p.m. to LI5 p.m. "z! per cent. 
of gas in Nos. z and 3 Rises (headings) caused through auxiliary out of order." 
Back shift of same day, "z! per cent. of gas in Nos. 2 and 3 Rises: auxiliary 
'an under repairs." 
Later on same back shift timed 8.15 p.m. to 9.10 p.m. .. Nos. 2 and 3 Rise 
clear. fan repaired." 
:-"'0 inspection on behalf of the workmen had been made in this district during 
this period. 
Electrical Layollt ill No. 2 Dislrict.-Plan No. 3 shows the arrangement of 
the electrical cables and apparatus in this district. 
The apparatus was supplied by a 100 kva Transwitch Unit [(r) on plan 
3,3001550 volts, situated in a substation on the low side of No. 3 Level. The oil 
circuit breaker on the 550 volt side of the transformer was fitted with earth 
leakage protection and controlled the main cable passing up No. 3 heading. 
This main cable passed through the busbars of a number of switches before 
dividing into several sub-circuits. No. 2 switch, at the foot of No. 3 heading 
controlled the main trunk belt conveyor in that heading and was operated by 
an adjacent push button. Nos. 6 and 7 switches, situated near No. 3 left thid, 
controlled a Mono pump in Ko. 3 heading and No. I fan respectively. The 
main and tail haulage in No. 2 heading was supplied by a cable teed off from 
the main cable just on the inbye side of �o. 7 switch. 
The main cable terminated at two section switches, Nos. 10 and H, a little 
below �'o. 4 right. No. IO switch controlled the coalcutter and drilling machine 
in No. 5 right and No. 2 fan; No. 1I switch controlled the two scraper chain 
conveyors feeding on to the No. 3 heading belt conveyor, one in No. 5 right 
and the other in No. 6 left, and the two duckbills in Nos. 2 and 3 headings. 
From ::'\'0. I J switch a pilot cable ran dO\\TI No. 3 heading back to a push-button 
switch at the transfer point on No. 3 leyel, enabling the starting and stopping 
of the branch conveyors to be controlled, in relation to the movement of the 
main belt conveyor, from this point. 
Just out bye of Nos. ro and II switches a branch cable led further up No. 3 
heading to supply No. 3 fan and the section switch, No. 19, controlling the 
supply to the coalcuttcrs and drills in the headings. 
The whole of the electrical apparatus in the district was of certified flameproof 
type, with the exception of the two shortwall cutters, two duckbills and the 
scraper chain conveyor in No. 5 right, which were of American design and 
manufacture. 
The main and branch roadway cables were paper-inSUlated', lead-sheathed 
and double wire armoured. the short lengths of cable between the duckbill ... 
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and their gate end switches were pliable wire armoured, as were the conveyor 
1'110t cables; the coaiculler and fan cables were screened trailing cables, and 
the drill cables were unscreened. 
A certified bell and apprO\'cd dry battery were used on the bare wire signalling 
system associated with the 30 h.p. main and tail haulage, the bare wires 
extending inbye as far as the return wheel at No. 5 left, and outbye to the 
bottom of No. 2 supply road. 
A similar dry battery signalling system was installed in No. 3 heading, the 
bare wires extending from the transfer point at the outbye cnd of the heading 
to about 20 yards inbye of No. -4 right, beyond which up to No. 6 left there 
was a pull wire by which �ignals could be transmitted out bye. 
IL-CONDITrONS LEADING UP TO THE EXPLOSION 
Unfortunately all the men who entered the No. 2 District or Unit on the 
morning of the explosion " .. ·ere killed, and in the absence of direct evidence as 
to the work on which they were engaged it is necessary to consider first the 
situation which existed when the night deputy left the district some two 
hours earlier, the discussions as to procedure which ensued, and then to form 
conclusions based on e\'iclence as to the position of the bodies and their injuries, 
the indications of force and other factors disclosed by subsequent investigations. 
The sequence of e\'ents leading up to the accident was as follows:-
Coal getting operations in the district ceased with the termination of the 
day shift on Saturday, 7th December at about noon, the fans being stopped and 
all electrical power cut off. 
At 10.30 p.m. on that day John Lewis Tubman, a shot firer and spare fireman, 
descended the mine accompanied by a pumpman (\Villiam Urwin) who was 
left at No. 6 pump on the main plane. After calling at No. 3 district and 
starting a pump there and also an auxiliary fan, Tubman proceeded to the 
No. 2 district where he travelled up by the main conveyor road (No. 3 heading) 
until he reached the first auxiliary fan (No. 2) used for ventilating No. 4 heading. 
Testing the air at the fan and fmding it clear and the tubes in order, he started 
the fan, after which he proceeded by way of No. 4 left thirl into No. 2 heading 
and back to No. 1 fan which was also started after making an examination in 
its vicinity. Retracing his steps to No. 3 heading and travelling inbye he 
rcached No. 3 fan where he found the air clear and started the fan. This fan 
was situated between TOS. 4 and 5 left thirls, but he proceeded inbre a little 
beyond No. 5 thirl and found all in order. It would then be about 2.15 a.m. 
according to Tubman's estimate. 
Some IS minutes after the fans were started Tubman made an inspection at 
the face of both No. 2 and No. '3 headings and found no indication of firedamp. 
There was a canvas screen or brattice immediately over o. 3 fan extending 
across the whole width of the road but with a small opening covered by a loose 
sheet through which the belt conveyor passed, and according to Tubman a 
.. good air" was being circulated. A canvas screen was also placed in No. 5 
right thirl over the top of the scraper chain conveyor about three yards from 
No. 3 heading, beyond which a T-piece was provided in the ventilating tubes 
from No. 2 fan with extensions into the face of No. 4 heading and the fast end 
of No. 5 thirl. 
Tubman came out of the district about 2.35 a.m. leaving the three f.'ms 
running, and after visiting other parts of the mine to sce that the pumps were 
working. reached the shaft and ascended about 5.35 a.m. 
It should be stated that he had gone in on this shift to get the pumps and 
fans started because it was intended to move No. 3 fan forward on the Sunday 
mommg. 
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Deputy John Proud Fisher descended at 6 o'clock on the Sunday morning 
accompanied by four men (including two maintenance engineers) for the 
purpose of moving forward the No. 3 fan, having seen Tubman in the pithead 
baths who told him how he had left things in TO. 2 district. Fisher and his 
men proceeded together to the old shuttle car charging station where they left 
some of their clothing. All the three fans were then funning. but on his way 
inbye to make an inspection, Fisher stopped first No. I fan and then No. 2 at 
about 7 a.m., the men following him inbye to No. 3 fan, a procedure not strictly 
in accordance with the requirements of Sect. 64 of the Coal Mines Act, 19II. 
He then inspected the face of Nos. 2 and 3 headings, testing for gas and, finding 
none, relumed to No. 3 fan (which he said was situated a little below No. 5 left 
thirJ) after having opened the door or flap (which was about 4 feet square) in 
the brattice screen over the conveyor belt to allow air to pass through to the 
face while the fan was stopped for mo\'ing up. Fisher disconnected the air 
tubes from the fan and left them suspended from the roof. 
The fan was then pulled inbye for some 50 yards by means of a shortwaU coal 
cutter (moved on the aturday from 1\0. 7 right thirl to No. 7 left thir! in 
readiness) the rope from which was extended by two short lengthening pieces 
to reach the fan, Glaister, one of the maintenance engineers, having first stopped 
the fan at the switch panel and then removed the plug from the fan socket. 
Having got the fan into its new position, where it stood on the floor, the trailing 
cable was dragged up to it, connected to the fan by Thomas Brown, the other 
maintenance engineer, and the switch having been put in at the switch panel 
by Glaister the fan re·started; the air tubes had been broken at a joint and 
re·attached to the fan. 
It is necessary to explain that to start the fan two operations were required, 
first the closing of the isolating switch at the switch panel and then the operation 
of the push·button on the same switch panel. Some doubt was raised in regard 
to the efficiency of this push-button, the suggestion being made that it some· 
times stuck-this point will be referred to later-but Fisher and Glaister 
affilmed that 011 this occasion it functioned without any trouble ana the fan 
re-started at once and continued running satisfactorily. 
About the time the fan had been got into its new position, Robert McCracken, 
who had been operating the coal cutting machin� and was the man nearest to 
the face, remarked" I think it is getting' dirty' up there "-meaning that 
there was gas or firedamp at the face. There was a flame safety lamp hung 
up about 10 yards on the inbye side of No. 7 thirling, which the deputy said he 
had been up to about five minutes before and had not noticed any indication 
of firedamp on it, though he knew" it was possible inbye that thirl to get dirty," 
and he did not bother about McCracken's remark as the fan was then ready to 
be re·started. This was about II a.m. the fan having been stopped over 
three hours. 
After starting the fan, the brattice screen across No. 3 heading having been 
removed entirely so as to lea\·e the road open, Fisher and his men came out to 
the charging station to have their bait. In about half an hour he returned to 
Nos. 2 and 3 headings and made a careful examination at the faces of each 
without finding any firedamp present. At that time the headings were beiog 
ventilated by an air tube in each, the fan was running normally, there was no 
fall or any movement of the roof to suggest the possibility of one at the junction 
of No. 2 heading and the No. 7 thirling, and after stopping the No. 3 fan he 
came outbyc at about II.55 a.m. \Vhile the fan was running the louvres were 
fully opened so that it would pass its full quantity of air, and it was left in this 
condition. Nos. I and 2 fans which had run during part of the shift were 
::.topped after the men had taken their bait, and were not re·started. 
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OriginaUy it had been intended to move up the switchgear controlling No. 3 
fan, but owing to the difficulty of hauling up the fan-between the old and new 
positions of the fan the height of the roadway had been reduced by leaving 
down part of the bottom coal-and the time taken to effect this. it was decided 
to lC3,oe the switchgear in its old position, the length of spare trailing cabl 
being sufficient to allow of this. The trailing cable therefore, as already stated, 
was pulled up by hand, and though no careful examination of it was made 
thereafter Glaister and Brown, who assisted with the work, said it was not 
damaged and they considered its condition satisfactory. 
General Regulation 13I (c) requires that the electrician shall be responsible 
for the fulfilment of certain duties to be carried out by him or by a duly 
appointed assistant, among which are (ii) the examination and testing of all 
new apparatus and of aU apparatus re-erected in a new position in the mine 
before it is put into service in the new position. 1t may be open to question 
whether such an examination and test was required in this case after the (an 
(not the switchgear) was moved up, but in my opinion it was. Reference will 
be made later to a piece of wire found after the explosion to be sticking out 
between the plug and socket attachment to the fan motor, evidently fitted to 
earth the pilot pin and complete the remote control circuit-the proper way 
would be to earth the pilot pin behind the plug socket to the framework of the 
motor or to use an interrupted pilot adaptor behind the socket, which latter 
method was in operation on some machines at this colliery. Glaister, who, as 
already stated, took out the plug before the fan was moved, and Brown who 
rtplaced it later both denied any knowledge of having seen such a wire, and 
said if they had seen it they would have taken it out; neither of them however, 
claimed to ha\"e made a very careful examination of the apparatus and as 
stated no electrical tests were carried out after moving up. 
Unless this wire was put in on the morning of the explosion (which seems 
unlikely) it must have been there when the fan was re-started after being moved 
forward, but apparently escaped the notice of the two maintenance engineers, 
both of whom were trained and regarded as assistant electricians. 
Before leaving the district after the fan had been moved up Glaister put the 
isolator at No. n panel in neutral so cutting off all current from the duckbills 
and scraper conveyors. It was the practice, he said, to have this switch closed 
during the week, it being opened and the isolator put in " neutral" by the day 
shift deputy at the end of his shift on the Saturday, and so left until the l\1ohday 
morning unless the maintenance engineers required the current for any purpose. 
On the Sunday afternoon Robert O'Neiil, a shotfirer, went down to atteml to 
some pumps in other parts of the mine, but sometime between 2.30 and 3.30 p.l11. 
h e  had occasion to go into No. 2 district to seek some grease near the s�rapcr 
conveyor in No. 5 right thirl. He did not examine the place, nor. apart from 
getting the grease, interfere with anything in the district. 
AJan Hannah, the night shift deputy (who had been a deputy only two 
months but had worked in No. 2 district previously), descended at I r  o'clock 
on the Sunday night accompanied by James Bateman, a pumpman. His duty 
was to see that the districts in the Main Band Seam were in order for the Monday 
morning shift entering. 
They proceeded together as far as the first (known as the" back end ") pump 
in the main haulage road where Bateman was left to attend to the pump and 
Hannah continued inbye to No. 2 district, which he entered by way of No. 2 
supply road or heading at about 12.15 a.m. (i.e., Monday morning). 
Arriving at No. I fan he examined there and finding no gas went into No. 3 
heading where the switch panel for this fan was situated and started it. He 
returned to the No. I fan and found it running satisfactorily, then rdurned to 
• 
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No. 3 heading and reaching No. 2 fan started it up. the air there being clear. 
Continuing on up No. 3 heading at approximately the junction of No. 5 left 
thirl he .. walked into an accumulation of gas." He had previously passed the 
switch controlling the No. 3 fan-he did not yet know the new position of the 
fan-but did not put it in because, as he said, " it is my job to make an 
inspection of the fan and the area around the fan to see that it is properly clear 
before starting the fan." 
Asked what he then did Hannah said, " When 1 came across this accumu­
Jation of gas r was surprised and I think shocked to fmd such an accumulation. 
To shift it properly would have meant that I would have to have more men, 
and where 1 was going to get them from 1 did not know. In fact there was no 
way of gett ing men or assistance at that time. I decided I would do my best 
to shift this accumulation and that J would open the door in No. 5 left, and this 
I did." .. This door," he said, " was about 6 feet high by 4 feet wide and was 
opened by fastening up the sheet which when closed hung down like a curtain. 
I then came down the belt road (No. 3), leaving the position as it was, and 
entering No. I district carried out my examinations and left that district clear." 
After about an hour or an hour and a quarter he returned to No. 2 district 
and went to No. 5 left thirl which he found clear. .. This" he said" proved 
to me that the intake and the felum from No. 5 left was clear of any obstruc­
tion; any obstntclion I thought that was preventing the air from travelling 
up to the last (No. 7) thirl, was up in that area. I then decided that r would 
take the tubes from the No. 2 fan out of No. 5 right and put them straight up 
No. 3 heading. It To do this he stopped No. 2 fan and then re-started it after 
fixing two lengths of tubing, i.e. 3-1- yards, up the No. 3 heading-the position 
of the Can was about 2 yards outbye of No. 4 left and the end of the tubes then 
some 10 yards beyond the entrance to No. 5 right. After transferring the 
tubes from No. 5 right thirl up the straight he opened the" door It of the canvas 
screen in that thirl to ventilate No. 4 heading. The velocity of air issuing from 
the tubes blowing up No. 3 was good; there was a good draught through the 
door in No. 5 left and the air seemed to be going beyond No. 5 left and being 
drawn back through that door. 
He said he tested the air outbye the end of the tubing in No. 3 heading by 
beating dust from his clothes and by breathing into the air to see if any re­
clrculation was taking place and there was none. He was satisfied the gas 
was not coming back on him but that the ventilation was taking its natural 
course, and then returned to Bateman at the pump to have his bait, leaving 
the No. 2 fan running. When he reached Bateman it was 3.5 a.m. 
Bateman was an old and experienced pitman and Hannah discussed the 
position with him; after having their bait they returned to No. 2 district 
together each having a flame safety lamp and a cap lamp. They went to TO.5 
left thirl and found the gas had receded somewhat further up No. 3 heading. 
Going through No. 5 thirl Hannah went as far as No. 2 heading where in making 
a test for gas his light was extinguished by the gas, showing that beyond that 
, thjrl the No. 2 heading was also fouled. 
Wishing to find out what the position was higher up Hannah, taking only 
his electric cap lamp, ran up to No. 6 left thirl (where there was a scraper chain 
conveyor) and opened the screen there. The canvas screen, he said, was opened 
in two halves, the first one on the prop on which the door was made by means 
of a five foot boring drill and the other side was jammed with a sleeper. On 
his way back he closed the screen in No. 5 left thirl, after having erected a fence 
at the junction of this thirl with No. 2 heading. He did not then test again 
for gas in No. 2 heading. In going up to No. 6 thirl Hannah passed the No. 3 
iaJi in its new position, but there was no bratticc sheet across the heading or 
other obstruction therein. 
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'Vhen he left the �o. 3 heading there was gas down to about 20 yards inbye 
of No. 5 left thirl, but the impression he gained was that air was passing inbye 
beyond that point. 
The door through the screen in No. 5 right thirl still remained open and was 
so left. Tests (or firedamp in the No. 4 heading and the extension of No. 5 
right thirl were made before and after removing the tubing from this thirl, but 
nonc was found . 
• -\5 nothing morc could then usefully be done in Ko. 3 heading Hannah pro-­
ceeded out bye, through No. 3 left thid into No. I heading, up this heading, 
leaving Bateman just inbye No. I fan and, following the course of the air tubes 
from No. I fan, went to near the end of the tube where he made an examination 
and found about onc per cent. of gas of which, however, he took little notice as 
it was nol uncommon to find a little there and he thought some gas would be 
coming from No. 2 heading. Although he did not then know that any one 
was to work there, he knew timber was being drawn out of these workings 
and that if men were to work in this section it would be at this place. This 
was where the brothers Bird were found after the explosion. It was about 
4.30 a.m. when this examination was made, and he then proceeded outbye 
by �o. 2 level to No. 4 district to make his pre-shift examination, leaving 
Bateman at No. 6 pump, and thence to the Lickbank Junction where he reported 
in the report book the accumulation of gas he had found in No. 2 district and 
that he had fenced the area off. Thereafter he proceeded to the shaft where 
he met the o\·erman Hoodless in the undennanager's cabin and told him of 
the position. The undennanager then came in and he too was told of the 
position. 
James Bateman gave confirmatory evidence of the conditions as found when 
he accompanied Hannah into the No. 2 district, except that he said that when 
the deputy first tested at the face of No. 4 heading his lamp, in Bateman's 
view, showed about one per cent. of gas present; when he tested later, however, 
there was none to be seen. 
Bateman further said that after lhe deputy had returned to him upon 
opening the screen in No. 6 left thirl they stayed some 15 minutes in the No. 3 
heading during which the deputy made several tests for gas; they formed the 
opinion that conditions were improving because, although Hannah wcnt no 
further up the heading during that time, he was able to raise his light a bit 
higher in the roadway before finding the gas. 
Ill-NARRATIVE OF THE EXPLOSION 
The morning shift on Monday, 9th December (the day of the explosion) 
descended at 5.30 a.m. It included 13 men and the deputy Miller who were 
to work in No. 2 district, and John McMullen, nonnally a stone worker but 
who was sent that morning to work at the transfer point at the entrance to 
No. 2 district, where the belt conveyor in No. 3 heading delivered its coal on 
to the main trunk belt. They were accompanied by the overman, \Villiam 
Hoodless. 
The task confronting these men was to get the accumulation of firedamp 
cleared as quickly as possible so that normal coal getting ope.rations could 
proceed in Nos. 2 and 3 headings. Since the night shift deputy had reported 
No. 4 heading and No. 5 right thirl extension fit for work it was considered 
apparently that these could start at once, and the positions of three of the 
bodies indicates that they had either started or were about to do so. Two others 
were to be employed in withdrawing supports in the old shuttle car workings 
and here they were found. 
I. 
Most of the others presumably were to assist in restoring the \'entilation­
the overman directing operations ; the plan of action, as explained by the 
overman to Glaister, was to advance the air tubes from No. 2 fan until No. 3 
fan was clear of gas and then to run the No. 3 fan. E\"idence was also given 
by Glaister of seeing two bales of canvas being taken inbye and being told by 
John Fox (one of the deceased) that he and his mate PRaurner were going to 
erect a canvas screen on the inbye side of the fan which had been moved up 
on the Sunday. The canvas bales would be taken up No. 2 heading to the 
return wheel, it was suggested, by means of the haulage engine in that road 
and then carried fon,'ard by hand. 
J.  \V. Glai!'ler, who had helped to move the fan up on the Sunday, went into 
the No. 2 district on the Monday morning to seek some tools he had left at the 
old charging station ; he arrived there aQout 7 o'clock and left about 7.45 a.m. 
to go into X o. I district in \\ hich he was to work. 
\rhen he left R. H. Brown the maintenance engineer in charge on that shift 
was still at the charging station. 
Glaister said the main belt in �o. 3 heading had not then been started as, 
if it had been running, he would have heard it from where he was at the charging 
station and also Brown would ha\'e proceeded at once to the heading. Nor 
was it running when he passed the transfer point and spoke to McMullen on 
his way to No. I district. 
On the other hand, John Mcl\1ullen, whose job it was to control the running 
of the No. 2 district belts and who although seriously injured by the explosion 
was able, fortunately, to gi\'e evidence at the Inquiry, said the main belt was 
running from about 7 o'clock almost continuously, though very little coal \\as 
being delivered by it at the transfer point-mostly in small intermittent 
patches of a few shoyelsful as though of cleanings up. 
He was actually engaged in cleaning up spiUage (of which there was more 
than usual) at the transfer point, and so probably was not paying very great 
attention to the belt delivery. 
Some minutes before the explosion occurred the deputy, Miller, came out bye 
to the transfer point. He asked McMullen what had been wrong with the belt, 
to which l\ldlullen replied that the trunk belt on the main road had been 
standing. The belt, however, had then been re-started and was running. 
Miller then retraced his steps inbye along No. 3 heading, and had only pro­
ceeded about IS yards when, as McMullen put it, " I knew no more." 
Mdlullen was later found unconscious-he had been burned on the left side 
of the face, right hand and the left thigh, and badly shocked. 
Glaister was working at a conveyor in No. I district about 600 yards from 
McMullen when the explosion occurred. He said it was like a heavy fall of 
stone and the blast which accompanied it fiung him over the con\'eyor and threw 
stone dust from the sides into the air. It was followed by a smaller explosion, 
perhaps seconds after the first one. 
Along with a mate working with him he came out to the transfer point of 
Ko. I district with the main trunk belt and tried to telephone but could not 
do so-the lines had been damaged. On No. 2 level he found the deputy who 
was going in to bring out his men, but the men were already on the way outbye. 
Together they all travelled out by No. 2 level, the usual travelling road. some 
distance and then through a thirl on to No. 3 level (the trunk belt road) and 
reached the transfer point of No. 2 district where they found the conveyor 
structure piled up in the roadway and other damage. It was not until later 
that McMullen was found here. From this point Glaister telephoned to the 
undennanager at the surface giving the alarm. 
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Thomas Barton. deputy in Ko. 4 district said the explosion sounded " like 
a big dull thud or the closing of a big door " and the auxiliary fan in his district 
stopped. He heard only one bump. He proceeded inbye. met some haulage 
boys coming out and then some men from No. 3 unit, and then passing the 
transfer point of No. '2 district where the air was thick with dust and smoke, 
was going into No. I district when he met men coming out and turned back 
\\;th them. On the instructions, by telephone, of the undermanager he went 
to examine some of the airways but coUapsed and was sent outbye. . 
Rescue and Recovery Operatio1ls-Rescue operations were set in motion with­
out delay and everything possible done to penetrate the affected workings to 
render slIch help as might be of avail to any of the unfortunate men. 
It  was soon evident that the explosion had lravelled outbye right to the 
transfer point on No. 3 road with considerable force, the air crossing (which 
was of substantial construction) having been demolished, doors and other 
ventilation arrangements destroyed, and numerous (and some heavy) falls had 
resulted. AU this made the work difficult, and because of the wet conditions 
unpleasant, but no effort was spared by officials or workmen of this and other 
collieries to reach the entombed men. By 9.45 on the morning of the explosion 
the first trained rescue team from Brigham Central Rescue tat ion had arrived 
complete with equipment under the direction of the Superintendent, Mr. 
CharHon, and they were quickly followed by the brigades from other coUieries 
in the coalfield, reserves standing by to undertake duty as needed. [n all, 
twelve brigades took part in the operations. 
A few men outside the No. 2 district who earlier had been slightly affected 
by afterdamp in the return were treated by the rescue teams, but unfortunately 
by the time those in the affected district could be reached they were dead, 
death in most cases having been instantaneous. 
By the Tuesday night all the bodies had been located, except that of lhe 
deputy Miller-he was not then known to have come outbye just before the 
explosion took place-and his was found on the Saturday night, several falls 
having, in the meantime, been cleared in an effort to locate it. 
Investigations by mines inspectors, colliery officials and others were pursued 
after the ventilation had been restored, further falls being cleared to examine 
electric apparatus and cables, some of which was brought to the surface for 
closer inspection. 
The positions of the bodies, pieces of apparatus, falls, etc. were carefully 
noted, and these are shown on Plan No. 1. The direction of force as shown 
by the displacement of stoppings, apparatus and supports was also recorded. 
1 personally made an inspection of the mine on 20th December accompanied 
by mines inspectors and officials of the COlliery. 
IV-CAUSE OF THE EXPLOSION 
The explosion was primarily one of firedamp. The deceased officials and 
workmen went into the district with the intention of clearing an accumulation 
reported by the nightshift deputy to exist in Nos. Z and 3 headings and which 
he had only partially succeeded in moving, and it is reasonable to conclude 
that the explosion occurred while they were thus engaged. There was general 
• agreement among the inspectors, management and 1\1r. Price (called as an 
expert by the owners) that the point of origin was within an area extending 
from half.way between No. 5 and No. 4 left thirl in No. 3 heading. outbyc 
down to and including No. 4 left thirl and No. 5 right thirl, but excluding No. � 
heading. This suggested area was extended slightly as between one witness 
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and another, but that indicated was common ground, and I am myself satisfied 
the explosion originated somewhere in this vicinity. 
The point at which an explosion commences frequently represents a quiescent 
spot with little or no evidence of force. the violence becoming evident as the 
explosion gathers momentum and is met by obstruction. 
But while witnesses said where they considered the starting point was, and 
also the course which the explosion subsequently followed, no one felt able to 
express any definite opinion as to the cause of ignition. It  therefore becomes 
necessary to examine the various possibilities. \Yhat then were the possible 
sources of ignition within the area described ? They were :-electricity, 
shotfiring, electric cap lamps and flame safety lamps. 
Electricity-Mr. Frederick Thomas Hindley, one of H.l\L Electrical Inspectors 
of Mines who made a detailed examination of the electrical plant after the 
explosion, and Mr. Joseph Pattinson the chief electrician at the colliery who 
accompanied him on these examinations, both gave evidence of certain defects 
found to which reference must now be made. 
(a) The first were in a bank of three panels, Nos. 13, 14 and 15 at .Ko. 4 left 
thirl. Two of these panels cOlltrolled the No. 2 fan and the coal cutter in the 
chain conveyor area, and the third one, No. IS, controlled the drilling 
machine in the same area-No. 5 right. Nos. 13 and 14 were G.A.I contactor 
panels and the bus-bar chambers communicated one with the other. No. IS 
was a MU.IO drill unit and a bus-bar end plate formed the connection between 
panels 14 and IS. There was therefore a continuous bus-bar chamber for 13 
and 14, but a barrier between that and No. 15 so that No. IS can be left out 
of further accoWlt. 
Examination showed that a loose incoming connection to the rear bus-bar 
in panel 13 had given rise, at some time, to considerable heating and arcing 
at this point ; solder from the cable lug had melted and splashed on the bottom 
of the chamber, and some fusion had occurred at the poor contact between the 
lug and bus-bar. Given sufficient load, or any vibration such as might be 
caused by the opening or closing of the contactor below, sparking would very 
probably occur at this faulty connection. 
The outgoing lOO amp. B.S. socket on No. 14 panel had at some time been 
replaced by one of another make and, owing to the difference in the fixing 
centres, could only be attached by one set stud instead of four. This did not 
form a flameproof joint between the base of the socket and the socket adaptor, 
and provided a path from the I3 and 14 bus-bar chambers to the external 
atmosphere. The socket which had been attached to No. 14 was found some 
little distance from the panel, having apparently been blown off by the ex­
plosion. The top left hand corner had been badly bent as if the socket had 
been lifted upwards against the stud to which it was secured, and the flange 
of the adaptor was also slightly bent at the corresponding corner. \'rl1en the 
socket was put back on the adaptor and bolted up with one bolt there was an 
opening at the lower end of the flange of almost a quarter of an inch. 
These two panels were brought to the surface and sent to the S.l\f.R.B. 
Testing Station at Buxton for official testing. which was carried out in the 
presence of representatives of the various parties. The tests carried out and 
the results were thus described by Mr. Rainford :-
The apparatus I received at the testing station, comprised two gate-end 
switch units coupled together such that the two bus-bar chambers formed a 
continuous chamber with a flit-plug mOWlting adaptor at one end and a 
blanking cover at the other end. Each unit was fitted with a marking plate 
• • 
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with the inscriptions Reyrolle-Hebburn, Type GAl/Xl, the FLP. crown 
mark and the reference number FLP. 1406. 
Q. Does that mean it was flameproof ? 
A. That means it was :1. certified flameproof design under that certified 
number. 
THE WITNESS (continuing) : The main enclosures were in accordance with 
the certified design except that the " start " and .. stop I t  push buttons were 
inoperative. The double bus-bar chamber, formed by the two single cham­
bers bolted together at a centre Banged joint, ,vas in accordance with the 
certified design. The outgoing cable attachment at the rear of Item No. 13 
bus-bar chamber, comprising an angle adaptor fitted with FLP. 1455 B.S. 
socket, was in accordance with the certified design. A similar angle adaptor was 
mounted at the rear of the No. 14 bus-bar chamber and that was in accordance 
with the certified design. but the adaptor was fitted with a S.S. plug socket 
marked FLP. 1319. the socket of which is not designed to suit the facing of 
the adaptor. 'Vith reference to that the difference between bolt centres Of 
the adaptor and the socket base would permit of only one fixing bolt being 
used as received at the testing station. This socket had a flange which was 
bent outwards at one corner where the one fixing bolt was fitted, so that when 
the bolt was screwed home the socket canted to onc side. This prevented 
the socket spigot from engaging fully with the bore of the adaptor facing 
and at onc side the socket flange joint was also left open with a gap of a 
quarter inch approximately. 
The last point recorded is that the removal of the top covers from the bus-bar 
chambers revealed a loose connection in Unit No. 13, between the outer 
bus-bar and the connecting lug on the end of one of the incoming cable tails, 
and there was evidence of heating and possibly sparking at this point. 
We prepared the double bus-bar chamber for test as regards flameproof 
enclosure by drilling and tapping the top access covers for the purpose of 
introducing an inflammable mixture of firedamp and air and also for the 
purpose of applying an ignition plug. \Ve made a series of three tests : no 
ignition of an external inflammable mi.xture was obtained with ignition of an 
internal inflammable mixture effected at a point adjacent to the faulty bUS-bar 
connection referred to above, this ignition point being remote from the open 
socket joint referred to. The damaged socket component was then replaced 
by a new socket of the same design, secured by the one bolt as before. The 
ignition point inside the chamber was not altered. and no ignition of an 
external inflammable atmosphere was obtained in a further series of three 
tests. The original socket with the bent flange was then replaced, so as to 
reproduce the open flange joint as before, but the ignition point inside the 
chamber was transferred to the other end of the chamber adjacent to the 
adaptor on which the socket was mounted. Under these conditions of test, 
ignition of the external inflammable atmosphere was obtained on the first 
test applied. 
That briefly covers the tests which were made. 
Q. Those are tests made with the ignition point at No. 13 panel corres­
ponding to where you found there had been certain evidence of flashing ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And the communicating point. if I may so put it, at the flange you 
• referred to in No. 14 box. Now can you tell us what distance there would 
be between the point of ignition and the point at which communication 
could be made with the outside atmosphere ? 
A. Approximately 24 or 25 inches, that is through the double bus-bar 
chamber round through the elbow adaptor to the base of the socket. 
16 
Q. In other words you have a point of ignition in No. Ij box and the 
point of communication with the outside atmospher� in No. 14 box and the 
distance between those two points is roughly two feet ? 
A. Ye!). In other words the ignition point was remote from the opening. 
Q. You made three tests, 1\" r. Rainford, and in no case did you get ignition ? 
You have had a lot of experience in tests of this kind. You would attach 
importance to the fact of this two feet distance between the igniting point 
a.nd the communicating point of the outside atmosphere ? 
A. I t  has been proved by experiment on a number of instances that 
ignition remote from an opening in such a way can reproduce conditions of 
flame propagation which would not allow flame to pass out of the opening. 
, Q. Only three tests were made, Mr. Rainford. \Vould you ha\'e expected 
if you had carried on for another three or six tests to have got an ignition ? 
A. No. Those tests were based on a wide range of experiments and we 
are able to limit such tests to a few which impose the most severe conditions. 
Vie made the most incendive mixture of the internal and the most easily 
ignitable mixture for the external mixture. 
Q. You yourself were quite satisfied that it was not possible to cause an 
explosion under these conditions of test ? 
A.  Under those conditions as reproduced for the test. 
Q. Now you did, I think, carry out a test with the point of ignition a little 
closer to the opening ? 
A.  Yes, mainly for our own information. \Ve have to take the opportunity 
of these circumstances to build up our own. experience of data, and for this 
purpose we transferred the point of ignition from the remote end of the 
bus·bars to the other end of the bus·bars which are adjacent to the elbow 
adaptor. On the first test we obtained an ignition made under those 
conditions of the external atmosphere. 
Uy Mr. Harvey-
Q. One of the first points you found in examining the apparatus was that 
the start and stop push-buttons were inoperative. Can you tell us for what 
reason ? 
A. After we completed the tests we took off the main access co\·ers and we 
found they were stuck in position by dirt. 
Q. It was not that the electrical apparatus was inoperative ? 
A. No, it was a mechanical defect of the push-buttons. 
Q. \Vas that due to the explosion in your view or was it likely to be a 
condition that obtained before the explosion ? 
A. From the condition of the push-button spindles I should say it was a 
condition before the explosion. 
Q. You did in effect carry out six tests with the apparatus ? 
A. Two series of three. 
Q. The first three tests, I understand, were made with the apparatus in 
the condition in which it was found after the explosion, that applies both to 
the socket and lhe adaptor, the socket with the bent comer ? 
A.  I am working on infonnation receh·ed at the time. I did not see the 
apparatus in the pit. 
Q. In the first three tests the socket with the bent corner was used for 
that purpose in that bent condition ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Is it not a fact the face flange of the adaptor was also slightly bent at 
that corner ? 
A. I t  was slightly bent. 
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Q. And in the second three tests the new adaptor socket flange was flat 
and the adaptor flange was also flattened with the hammer before the tests 
were carried ou t ? 
A. That is so. 
Q. In your opinion were the conditions of the first three tests as likely to 
produce an explosion as you could make them in the circumstances ? 
A. Yes, definitely. 
The defect thus disclosed 1'5 very disquittillg and ought tlot 10 hat" existed, but 
on the result o/ lIle tests described, this pmlet cannot be IJtld 10 be responsible for the 
explosio" , 
(b) Another defect was discovered at the No. 3 fan. Here a piece of 26 s.w.g. 
wire was found looped round the base of t he pilot terminal in the fan cable 
socket, with the ends brought out between the bore of the socket and the plug 
body. This wire formed part of the electrical interlock circuit, the proper 
connection between the pilot terminal and the motor casing having been 
omitted. 
It  was considered that if this wire were making only poor or intermittent 
contact, particularly if this was towards the outer end of the socket and the 
interlock circuit was not intrinsically safe, then any sparking between the wire 
and socket or plug might have been incendive . . 
This apparatus also was sent to Buxton and submitted to test with the result 
given in evidence by Mr. Henry Robinson, a Scientific Officer of the Safety in 
Mines Research Board :-
I received an Aerex fan, to which was coupled by belting a 10 h.p. induction 
motor made by Metropolitan Vickers. The motor name plate bore an 
inscription FLPL03, Group I ,  with the serial number of the motor. There 
was also a gate-end panel which was marked 18 in chalk, made by Reyrolte, 
Hebburn-on-Tyne. That carried the FLP certificate No. q06 for Groups 1 
and 2, together with the identification number A. 688. 1 also received onc 
length of trailing cable complete with two plugs, one marked No. 2, which 
married with the socket on the 10 h.p. motor, and the other marked No. I,  
which married with the socket on the gate-end panel. 
I was informed by the Electrical Inspector that the electrical circuit had 
been completed in the pit by the use of a piece of 26's gauge wire, in a manner 
which has no doubt been described to you already. I therefore made my 
own connection in the same way and attempted to start up the fan by 
operating the push button on the gate-end box. I found that although the 
fan would start up it would only continue to run so long as that push button 
was kept depressed by hand. In order that the fan should run continuously 
that push button had to be kept spragged down by a wedge or some similar 
device. If pressure was removed from the push-button the fan stopped 
immediately, and throughout the whole of my tests I had to adopt that 
expedient in order to get the fan to run. 
1 opened up the gate·end panel to find out what was the cause of this 
defect and found that one of the leads which runs from the lenninal of the 
push button to the No. 4 contactor was broken. The result was that, when 
the pilot circuit was completed and the contactors were closed, No. 4 con· 
tactor failed to short-circuit the push buUon switch, and hence as soon as 
• the push button switch was released the circuit was broken and the motor 
stopped. 
Q. Could you form any opinion as to whether that was a defect which had 
been continuing ? 
A. No, none whatever. I t  was just a clean break in a piece of wire at a 
point where it is normally anchored underneath a tenninal screw. 
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Q. And when that break was made of course you cannot say. nor form any 
opinion ? 
A. No, sir it is quite impossible for me to say. Having got the equipment 
into a state where I could get the fan to run, I examined the fan first of all 
to see whether there were any signs of friction between the blades of the 
rotor and the casing of the fan. I found that the rotor ran smoothly in the 
casing without contacting the sides, and I observed the fan running for a 
long period in a dark room at its rated speed, and I could find no evidence of 
sparking caused by friction between the rotor and the casing. I did not 
proceed any further with that test. I was satisfied that if an ignition of gas 
had occurred it had not occurred as a result of frictional sparking. 
I then proceeded to assemble the plug to the socket, using a piece of 26's 
gauge wire on a number of occasions. I found invariably that if I used a 
piece of new wire the motor ran perfectly and I could get no sparks whatever 
between the outbye end of that piece of wire and the earthed plug or socket. 
showing that a very good contact had been made. After each trial I stripped 
the plug from the socket, removed the piece of \\;re for examination and 
found that it had been flattened oyer the length where it was trapped between 
the plug and the socket. That is a length of about one and a half inches. It 
had been flattened from its original thickness of about eighteen thousandths 
variously down to sixteen thousandths and eleven thousandths, showing 
that the gap between the plug and the socket was something in tbe order of 
sixteen thousandths to eleven thousandths of an inch wide. 
There was clear evidence on the surface of the wire of where it had been 
trapped, and I have no doubt whatever that a perfectly good contact was 
made providing that the wire was only used once. In the course of my 
trials I used one and the same piece of wire on four successive occasions and 
found that it became progressively thinned by being trapped, and eventually 
in its minimum thickness was only about eight thousandths of an inch. 
1 wished to try the effect of using a piece of dirty or oxidised wire, but not 
having any available I decided to use a piece of wire which was coated with 
enamel. r removed the enamel from that part of the wire which was 
anchored round the pilot pin in order to get a good contact there, and then 
brought the remainder of the wire out through the gap between the plug and 
the socket in the usual way, but the wire that I used was only twelve and a 
half thousandths of an inch thick ; that is to say, a thickness which was 
approximately the same as the thickness of the 26's gauge wire which had 
already been squeezed down in my earlier experiments. Under those 
conditions I found that it was not a difficult matter to dispose the plug in 
the socket in such a way that I could get any one of three separate effects. 
I could get a very good contact between the plug and socket and the wire 
mutuaUy so that the motor ran quite normally, and I could not get any 
sparking whatever from the outbye end of the wire. On the other hand, 
sometimes I could get no contact at all. The motor would not then start up 
although the switches had been closed. Now under those conditions I could 
get sparking repeatedly from the outbye end of the wire, and with that 
sparking I ignited gas on quite a number of occasions. I could also get a 
third state of affairs where the wire was makillg only a poor contact between 
the plug and the socket. The contact was good enough to aUow the pilot 
circuit to close the relays, and hence for the motor to nUl, but it was not 
good enough to keep the wire at earth potential, with the result that when I 
stroked the plug with the outbye end of that wire 1 could get sparks from it 
again-not so vivid as they were before. but even with those less vivid sparks, 
dter continued trial I did succeed in igniting firedamp on four occasions. 
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The tests that I have described. sir, were carried. out prior to a visit which 
was paid to the Research Station by Mr. Harvey and Mr. Young and the 
various other people, and on the occasion of their visit J attempted to repeat 
all these tests. The tests were aU rep�ated in their presence, with the sole 
exception of the test where [ attempted to get no contact, so that the motor 
would not start up ; the tests under which, as [ said, I could get repeated 
ignitions of gas. 
Q. That is Test 2 ? 
A. Yes. I was not able to repeat that in its entirety. r was able to 
dispose the plug in the socket in such a way that the motor would not start 
up, but as soon as I got hold of the outbye end of the wire to stroke it across 
the earthed plug the act of touching the wire completed the contact some· 
where inside and started up the motor, so that I could not show that test in 
its entirety. 'Vhat I did, however, wa� to demonstrate in this way, that by 
taking the plug out of the socket I was able te show that any sparks which 
could be drawn from the pilot circuit were certainty capable of igniting gas. 
1\Ir. Hindley produced on that occasion the identical piece of wire which 
had been removed from the plug and socket assembly in the pit. That piece 
of wire I found to be extremely dirty, almost black with corrosion and 
oxidation, and in the state that it was, it approximated, I assert, to the 
enamelled wire that I was myself using. 'Vhen tbat identical piece of wire 
was assembled again to the plug and socket the motor ran quite satisfactorily, 
but we could not get sparks from the outbye end of the wire when we stroked 
it against the earthed plug. The most that we could do, by moving the 
plug in the socket whilst the wire was in position and watching the contactors 
in the gate-end panel, was to notice that on three or four occasions those 
contactors came out, showing that the pilot circuit was being broken even 
with the piece of wire which was used in the pit, but I could not synchronise 
my attempts to stroke that wire across the earthed plug with the attem.pts 
which I was making at the same time, by moving the plug about, to break 
the circuit somewhere further up. 
That, sir, is the extent of the tests which 1 carried out. 
Q. Now ,vlth this actual wire which was later produced what condition 
would you have required to produce sparking ? 
A. You would require conditions under which the wire was not making a 
very good contact with the plug and socket, or was making no contact at all. 
Under either of those conditions you could draw sparks from the out bye end 
of the wire which are capable of igniting gas. 
Q. You say you could draw sparks ? 
A. Yes, by bringing the wire into contact with an earth you would have 
got a shower of sparks. 
Q. You have referred to the wire in your earlier tests being reduced in 
thickness by being trapped, and the progressive reduction increased the 
risk, I take it ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had this wire you received, the actual piece of wire, been reduced ? 
A. Yes, I measured that in what appeared to me at the time to be about 
its thinnest place and it was down in thickness to about ten thousandths of 
an inch. That was its condition after it had been used again by me in my 
tests at Buxton. 
Q. SO that that would correspond in section to the worst condition which 
you produced in your tests ? 
A. Yes, I attempted to reproduce those conditions by choosing the right 
diameter of wire for my tests. 
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Q. And as you saw the actual wire and the condition of the apparatus 
what would be your opinion as to the possibility of that having ignited 
firedamp ? 
A. Well sir, I should not put it higher than this, that there is a remote 
possibility that you could have the conditions all such at one and the same 
time as to make all ignition possible, but I would like to say that the chances 
of getting such an ignition arc very considerably increased by the defect in 
the gate-end panel. Jf it were the fact in the pit that that gate-end panel 
had had to have its push-button switch kept depressed by means of a sprag, 
then any dangers which there might be in the pilot circuit arc very vastly 
increased by the adoption of that practice. In fact, to do that is to throw 
away onc of the most valuable safety precautions in that gate-cnd panel. 
1\lay 1 go further, sir ? 
Q. Yes, do. ] t  is an important point and I want you to make it. 
A. The point is this, that if that gate-end panel were in perfect work�ng 
order and this push-button switch did not need to be depressed, then if you 
got a break in the pilot circuit, say at the motor end of the trailing cable, 
Immediately you got a break there the push button switch would fIy out, 
and from then onwards the whole of the line would be dead ; there would be 
no energy there. 
Q. It would break the circuit ? 
A.  It would break the circuit completely. If, on the other hand, you 
kept the push-button switch on the panel held down permanently by means 
of a wedge or a sprag, then for e\'ery contact which you make at the remote 
end of the trailing cable, each contact will give its own electric spark. To 
go further, if therefore at the remote end of the trailing cable you imagine 
intermittent contacts, repeated contacts, if the gate-end box is in perfect 
order only the first one of those contacts will give a spark and the remainder 
will give no sparks, but if you have a push button switch spragged down every 
individual break will give its own spark, and that is why it very considerably 
increases the possibility of getting dangerous sparking. 
Q. SO the lesson to be learned from that is that push buttons should not 
be spragged in position ? 
A. 1\105t certainly. 
They should work in their proper way, as they were intended to work. 
By Commissiollcr-
Mr. Harvey, is there anything you would like to elucidate ? 
By Mr. f/arvly-
Q. Heferring to this broken connection inside the gate-end box, bearing 
in mind the fact that the apparatus was conveyed from Harrington Colliery 
to the Testing Station at Buxton on a lorry under conditions of difficulty, 
o\'er bad roads, do you consider that it is possible that the wire was broken 
away from the terminal in transit ? 
A. I think it is a very definite possibility. 
Q. I take it that you obtained the sparking between the wire in the plug 
by stroking the end of the wire against the earthed casing of the plug ? 
A. That is so. 
Q. Supposing the end of the wire had been in contact with the plug, could 
that have been reproduced by vibration of the fan during running ? 
A. Yes, that is the most likely way in which it would occur underground. 
Q. Always supposing that the fan was running at the time ? 
A.  Yes. 
Glaister, it will be recalled, stated in evidence that when this fan was re­
started after moving up on the Sunday the press button was in order and worked 
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satisfactorily, so it would appear that the broken connection inside the gate-end 
box was caused after that, most probably in getting the apparatus out of the 
pit and transporting it to Buxton. 
On this evidence, therefore, it must be concluded that the possibiljty of the 
piece of wire between the plug and the socket used as an external earth having 
resulted in inccndive sparking was very remote, though in certain circumstances 
the possibility could not altogether be dismissed. 
It should be pointed out that the pilot circuit in this C3!)C was covered by a 
Buxton certificate of intrinsic safety, which in the light of the tests following 
the explosion may need to be revised. 
There was a concenSU5 of opinion among the technical witnesses that the fan 
could not have been running when the explosion took place and therefore could 
have no connection with it. This was based chiefly on the fact that two of the 
four belts used for driving the fan were found broken and lying in the fan casing. 
These had the appearance of having been cut or torn straight across by the 
fairing over the fan pulley which was dented in by the explosion, whereas. it 
was contended. if the fan had been running at the time the belts would have 
been cut longitudinally and would have been drawn into the blades of the fan. 
This was said to have happened previously when belts had broken. 
\Vhilst in view of the clear evidence of the fan having been struck by a major 
force reaching it from some point outbye I was satisfied the explosion did not 
originate at it, it was important to know whether the fan was running or Dot. 
and, to clear up this point as far as possible, I considered it necessary to have 
a detailed examination of the fan and the belts carried out by a mechanical 
engineer ; this was done by Mr. A.  E. Crook, HJ\'l. Mechanical Engineering 
Inspector of Mines after the Inquiry was closed, and his report is given as 
Appendix I l l .  
This shows conclusively that the fan was rotating at a considerable speed 
when the inlet fairing, severely damaged by the force of the explosion, was 
brought into contact with two of the driving belts c..1using them to break. 
Having regard to the magnitude of the force necessary to so damage the fairing 
-and also to bring about the other damage seen in the immediate vicinity of 
the fan-and the speed with which such a force must have travelled. it seems 
to me inconceivable that the one force-there was no evidence of any other­
striking the fan should have (in sequence) started it from rest, accelerated 
rotation to a high speed and then driven in the fairing with great violence to 
fracture the belts. 
I am convinced that when Ihe explosio" occurred No. 3 /alJ l£1aS nawing i1, the 
110rmal mallltcr. 
(c) There were three points at which cables were found to have sustained 
damage, and in each case the cable was opened up and carefully examined : 
the conclusion reached in all was that the damage resulted from the explosion 
and had not been the cause of it ; moreover, none of these damaged parts was 
within the immediate area in which the explosion was deemed to have 
originated. 
Owing to their being buried under falls it was not possible to examine 
minutely all the cables, but they were all tested for insulation and conduttivity 
without any defects being revealed. 
/l1y e01Iclusio}, there/ore is that the cxplosioll b'as not caused by elee/ridty. 
Slwt-jiri..g-
On the morning of the explosion the only person in the No. 2 district 
responsible for the charging and firing of shots was the deputy, Tom MiUer. 
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He was issued by the colliery policeman and explosives keeper (Alfred 
Stephenson) with detonators in a locked tin-the key being kept by the deputy 
-but no record was kept of the actual number, the practice being to record 
the number at the end of the shift when the tin was returned and the number 
used was also ascertained. Stephenson said, however, that it was usual to 
issue 30 in the tins, which were filled up again at the end of the shift before 
re-issue, and that would be the number given to Mil.ler. 
As wiU be seen on Plan No. I ,  after the explosion 22 detonators were found 
in )So. 3 heading between Nos. 4 left and 5 right thirls-they were in two 
bundles of 10 each a,nd two single. A tin was also found badly damaged with 
the lid severed, which it would seem had contained the detonators. If in fact 
Miller took 30 detonators into the district eight remain to be accounted for. 
H is possible some of them were set off by the explosion, or, as the manager 
suggested, they might be buried among dirt and debris which had not been 
cleared up. 
The explosives were carried in by the men who were to use them and on the 
morning of 9th December, for the No. 2 district, one tin was issued to Hill and 
one to Chapman, each containing 5 lb. of Dynobel. Some four or five days 
after the explosion these tins were returned to the store. One remained full 
as issued, and a little (about a pound) had been used from the other. 
In No. 4 heading some distance back from No. 5 right thirl a battery exploder 
was found with one lead attached ; it was the practice in the headings to use 
two leads, one on each side of the road, and the manager explained that they 
were usually left lying in that position. A powder tin was also found in this 
heading. but Stephenson could nol state definitely whether it was this tin 
from which the explosive had been used. 
There was some argument as to whether a shot had been fired at the face of 
the extension to No. 5 thirl out of this heading. Robert O'Neill, a shot firer, 
stated that on the Saturday morning before the explosion he fired six shots in 
this place-ooe by Cardox and five by explosives-most of the coal from which 
was filled out on that shift before he left, but probably four or five tubs would 
remain. The shots were not good shots and some sockets were left on. After 
the explosion he had seen this place, and had formed the opinion there was 
" a bit " more coal lying than on the Saturday, from which together with the 
fact, as he said, that after firing on the Saturday he left the exploder near the 
corner of No, 5 thirl and the No, 3 heading, he concluded that one or more 
shots had been ftred on the morning of the explosion, He brought his 
detonators out with him to the surface on the Saturday. 
On the other hand evidence was called to show that on the morning of the 
explosion the conveyor in No. 3 heading did not run as long as McMullen had 
estimated, that very little coal came out of it, and that the presence of the 
sockets from shots and the general appearance of the face indicated that no 
further shot had been fired. 
There was general agreement that if any shot was fired in this place on the 
morning of the explosion it would be by the deputy Miller, but there was no 
suggestion by anyone that even if this did happen it had anything to do with 
the explosion. The positions in which the deputy, and the three men Nos. 
2, 5 and 6 were found clearly supports this view, and I therefore cOllclude that 
shot firing was not respollS1'ble for the explosio1l. 
Electric Cap Lamps-
The electric lamps in use were all Oldham-\Vheat Type " Q " cap lamps ; 
some of the lamps were recovered complete and parts of others were found, 
and all were subsequently examined by, 
Major Platt �t the �f,ining Equipment 
Testing Station, Sheffield, who gave eVIdence on therr condition as follows :-
• 
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I came to this conclusion, that a number of the lamps were in such 
a condition that they were not likely to have been the cause of any 
ignition in the mine. As regards other lamps which were incompiete­
that is to say, the head pieces were missing. and those headpieces had 
apparently been wrenched away from the battery cable by force-whilst 
the batteries were in good condition, as also were the cables, r could 
not give any opinion as to the safety of the missing head pieces. and 
the doubt comes in as to the safety of those because 1 was unable to say 
whether those headpieces were in safe and good condition immediately 
before the explosion. [f one of them had been smashed with respect to the 
protecting glass and the glass envelope of the lamp bulb, it is possible that 
gas might have been ignited by exposed incandescent filament. As regards 
the three smashed headpieces unaccompanied by any other part of the lamp, 
all three of those were badly smashed-I think it is quite fair to say, obviously 
by violence. Two of those head pieces had complete protecting glasses, but 
the glass envelope of the lamp bulbs was smashed, and it might be that the 
smashing of the envelopes of the lamp bulbs would ha\'e exposed the 
incandescent filament to gas, which would have entered the headpiece 
through the smashed moulding of the shell. I cannot say any further than 
that. As regards the third smashed head piece-these are the three head­
pieces I received from Mr. Kussey subsequently-although the bakelite 
moulding of the sheU was badly smashed, the protecting glass and the lamp 
bulb were both intact, and [ suggest that that headpiece had no part to play 
in the ignition. I think that summarises what 1 found, sir. 
By Mr. Salldlallds-
Do not think I am raising this as a probable starter, but r want to eliminate 
it : It is a fact, is it not, that if the cable connecting the cap lamp to the 
battery carried by the miner is severed or broken, you might get a spark, 
which could ignite gas if the man was in. it ? 
A. It can be done under certain circumstances, yes. 
Q. It is just a possibility ?  
A. Yes. 
Q. And it is also a fact that a cable which was perfectly sound on 
examination on the miner entering the Pit might get damaged in the course 
of his work ? 
A. That is so. 
Q. It is only just to show that it has not been overlooked. You do not 
think in this case it is reaUy a serious thing that we need consider ? 
A. No, certainly not. 
Having regard to the area in which it was agreed the ignition occurred, only 
lamps nwnbered 139, 131, 156, 499, and 20 belonging respectively to Addison, 
Hill, Largue, Hoodless and Brown, need be considered. 
The first three were in a complete state of assembly and were reported safe 
for use. Of No. 499 Major Platt reported that the cable sheathing was stripped 
back 4 or 5 inches from the gland on the headpiece, but this stripping of the 
sheathing played no part as a source of ignition ; otherwise the lamp was in 
safe condition. 
The battery and cable of No. 20 lamp were in good condition, but the head­
piece had been wrenched off. A head piece which was thought to be that 
missing from this lamp was badly smashed, but the protecting glass and lamp 
bulb were still intact, and it was considered that this headpiece was not 
responsible for causing an ignition. 
Although it is not I)()!;�iblc to state with certainty that the lamp worn by 
R. Brown was undamaged before the explosion it would require some force to 
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wrench the head piece from the cable, and there was no indication of anything 
having happened apart from the explosion to account for this. 
It seems 10 me most improbable, therefore, that tile ig1l1'tjon origi1lated from an 
electric cap [amp. 
Flame Safety Lamps-
There were three flame safety lamps in the district at the time of the 
explosion. One of these, No. SI an ordinary type miner's lamp, was found 
intact, locked and in good order, near to the bodies of the brothers Bird in the 
old shuttle caT workings, and on examination by Major C. B. Platt, Super­
intendent Testing Officer of the Sheffield Mining Equipment Testing Station, 
was found to be in safe working condition. 
The other two were found in No. 4 left thirl in a damaged condition and 
dispatched as found to Major Platt who gave evidence as to his examination 
of them as follows :-
Two of the flame safety lamps were officials' type lamps fitted with self­
contained internal re-lighters, and both of those lamps were received in 
pieces ; that is to say, they were not fully assembled. Lamp No. 2 was 
received with the bonnet and the gauzes detached from the lamp frame. 
The spirit vessel was in position and locked to the lamp frame. The fabric 
of the top of the outer gauze was dented and torn away, making that gauze 
unsafe, although the lamp would still be protected by an intact second 
gauze. \Vith regard to the re-lighter of that lamp, the pyrophor bar, 
popularly called a flint, and the compression spring which presses the flint 
on to the friction wheel of the re-lighter mechanism, were both missing, 
although the small brass cap which holds those two components in the 
re-lighter mechanism was present and properly assembled in the re-tighter. 
All the other parts of the lamp were intact. 
As regards lamp No. 17, all the parts of this lamp were received in good 
order and properly assembled, except that the spirit vessel was unlocked 
and received by me unscrewed and separated from the body of the lamp. 
The top surface of the spirit vessel, which is normally protected against dirt 
by the base of the lamp frame. was heavily coated with mine dust. 
Lamps Nos. 2 and 17 were produced and inspected in court. As regards 
the latter Major Platt showed that the screw-thread was perfectly efficient, 
and said if the spirit vessel had been wrenched of[ by the explosion he would 
have expected the threads to be badly damaged and stripped, but they 
indicated no undue play or wear. 
Questions were put to Major Platt as follows :-
By Commissioller-
Q. Major Platt, the effect of what you have told us is this : that so far 
as .:"lo. 2 lamp is concerned you are satisfied that the damage which you have 
described could have been caused by the explosion ? 
A. As regards the removal of that bonnet. I think so ; possibly the damage 
to the outer gauze. 
Q. Possibly the damage to the outer gauze ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And even so, there was still one gauze left undamaged ? 
A. That is so. 
Q.  And as regards No. 17, you say, I gather, quite definitely that it would 
not be possible to unscrew the oil \"essel and expose a naked light to the 
outside atmosphere ? 






Q. \\'hat could ha\'e been the purpose of unscrewing this No. I7 ? 
\\'hoover did it, what could have been the purpose of it ? 
A.  That lamp is fitted with an internal relighter which might not have 
been working efficiently. Cases have been known of lamps being opened 
with a yiew to adjusting the working of the internal relighler. It is a very 
Wlsafe thing to do, of course. 
' 
By CommissiolleT-
Q. If it were opened in the pit (we have not any eddence of that yet, of 
course, nor may we have). that might have been a possible reason for 
opening it ? 
A. It  might have been. 
Q. To adjust the relighter ' 
A. Yes, but that is a highly dangerous operation. 
Q. Why ? 
A. Because when the spirit vessel is removed from the lamp the inside of 
the lamp is left wide open to the outer atmosphere, and the Pyrophor 
relighter can produce a spark which would light gas within the lamp and the 
flame would come out through the top, which is nonnally fitled by the 
burner of the lamp. 
Q. SO that with the vessel unscrewed the relighter could be worked and 
produce a spark ? 
A. Exactly. For the Coroner's benefit, I mar explain that the Pyrophor 
relighter is, in effect, exactly the same in principle as a cigarette lighter. 
As regards No. 2 lamp (which belonged to the overman Hoodless) it seems 
to me reasonable to conclude that the damage occurred either some time before 
or resulted from the explosion, and that since its inner gauze was still in good 
condition it could not have been responsible for igniting firedamp in what must 
have been a more or less quiescent atmosphere. �o. 17 lamp, however, 
presents a very different position which demands serious exami.nation. 
The oil vessel or well of this lamp was found detached from the rest of the 
lamp, the \'essel being about mid-way along No. 4 thirl and the remainder at 
the junction of No. 3 heading with that thirl and near the body of Hoodless. 
In a signed statement the Manager (Mr. Graham) asserts that at about 
3 p.m. on the day following the explosion he was on one side of the brattice 
sheet erected across No. 4 left thirl about 10 feet from the side of No. 3 heading 
and Mr. Hughes (the Agent) was on the other side. .. \Vhen I rejoined him he • 
ga\'e me the well part of a flamelamp and showed me where he had found it. 
I gave it to Joe Pattinson, Chief Electrical Engineer, who put it in his pocket 
and took it to the surface, where it was kept in the surveyor's office until it 
was dispatched to Sheffield. I marked on the master plan under the super-
vision of the surveyor the place in which Mr. Hughes told me he had found the 
part of the lamp. This part was the one subsequently identified as belonging 
to No. 17 lamp. Both parts of the lamp are in my pos ession and they are, 
in my opinion, in a similar state to that in which they were found, except that 
they have been cleaned." 
Thomas Nicholson, an ovennan, who was captain of onc of the Rescue teams, 
descended at about 9 p.m. on the night of the explosion to explore the No. 3 
heading, the air of which they found very thick. In one of the left hand thirls 
he asserts about 5 or 6 feet round the corner he kicked a flame lamp tOp which 
he picked up, brought back into the heading and placed on the belt conveyor. 
Here it was subsequently seen by the undermanager and others and its posiHon 
marked on the plan. Nicholson did not see the well part of the lamp. 
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From this I am satisfied beyond any doubt that the two parts of this lamp 
were found detached in the positions stated, and since the SCfew threads of the 
vessel were in perfect condition and the lamp could easily be re-assembled by 
screwing up the vessel (as was done in Court) the vessel must ha\"e been un­
screwed and removed from the body of the lamp before the explosion. 
The lamp belonged to the deputy Miller, who when the explosion occurred 
was some 300 yards away from it. \Vhy he had gone outbye and why in doing 
so he had left his flame lamp behind it is not possible to say, though if his 
journey was to be restricted to the main conveyor road he would not, of course, 
be likely to need his flame lamp as he had an electric cap lamp. Moreover, the 
flame lamp would be morc likely to be useful to the overman who was engaged 
in clearing gas from the headings inbye, particularly if Hoodlcss' lamp was 
out of order. 
The manager and other witnesses spoke in the highest terms of the experience 
and personal qualities of the overman, deputy and the deceased workmen, and 
considered that none of them would be guilty of illegally opening a safety lamp 
in such circumstances. \Vhile appreciating this attitude of confidence in the 
integrity of these officials and workmen, the fact has to be faced that the 
lamp was opened by someone, and I think an explanation can be offered which, 
without condoning the offence, affords reasonable grounds for the action taken, 
1 do not for a moment suggest that Hoodless would knowingly open the lamp 
in the presence of firedamp ; but what was the position which confronted him ? 
Three men (Nos. 8, 9 and 10 on plan) were working near No. 3 fan ; they 
were either in or on the fringe of an accumulation of firedamp and they had no 
means of ascertaining the condition of the air. It was suggested in e\'idence 
that these men were either engaged in erecting or had just erected a brattice 
sheet across No. 3 heading at the fan, and there could, of course, be no object 
in putting up such a bratlice unless the fan was running or was about to be 
run. It  was essential that Hoodless should know what was happening to the 
gas in that region, especially if, as I am satisfied was the case, the fan had 
been started. 
If, as I think it reasonable to assume, No. 2 lamp was out of action-it might 
possibly have already been damaged or, i f  it had been extinguished it could 
not be relighted because of the missing pyrophor bar-he was left with No. 17 
lamp bonowed from the deputy. He had possibly been up to these men to 
make a test with this lamp and had had the light extinguished and it failed to 
relight. To relight or examine it. or to get another lamp he would need to go 
a considerable distance outbye and waste valuable time. 1n his anxiety to 
get the ventilation restored and the headings restarted, why should he not 
take the lamp outbye to a spot he considered to be free from firedamp, and 
there examine it and carry out any necessary adjustment ? No. 4 left thirl 
would seem to him to be a proper place for this purpose, since it was close to 
No. 2 fan which was blowing fresh air up the No. 3 heading, and No. 5 right 
thirl was partially open allowing some fresh air to pass up the heading through. 
the thirl and down the No. 4 return. 
S1fch u'ert tht circumstances £n wltich I visualise lite lamp being opelled. After 
rcmovillg the oil vessel Hoodless was, I thit/k, trying the relighter whm it operatea 
and ignited firedamp. The medical evidence showed that he was burned but 
suffered no external injury from violence. the cause of death being lack of 
oxygen and carbon-monoxide poisoning. 
All the evidence poillts 10 there having been at this point all inflammable miX/lire 
w/tich CO,ltinued illbye lIP No. 3 head£r.g, the perceufage of firedamp in Ihe ai, 
gradually i"creasillg 1wt£1 somewhert 1'�1 the regio�t of No. 5 left /hirl if rtached 
explosive point and there exploded wrth great VIOlence. The )/0. 3 fan was 
• 
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projected several yards inbye, the three men near suffered vcry serious multiple 
injuries, and the chain conveyor engine was thrown inbye and the pans 
doubled round the corner of the No. 6 left thirl. The explosive force 
passed through the No. 6 thirl into No. 2 heading and thence right and left. 
In its passage down No. 3 heading the flame entered No. 5 right thirl at the 
extension of which, or af the face of No. 4 heading, there was some augmenta­
tion of firedamp which caused victims 2, 5 and 6 to be severely burned without 
otherwise suffering serious physical injury. 
How is the presence of firedamp in inflammable mixture so far down the 
No. 3 heading to be accounted for, having regard to the evidence of deputy 
Hannah as to the position when he left the district ? The explanation, in my 
view. lies in th� slarti'''g of No. 3 fan, a"d this I am co,wi"ctd was th� fac{OI 
which Ih� overman fm1ed la lak� 1" ltO aCCOlml and by which he was d�ceit'ed. 
The capacity of this fan with the louvres full open (as Fisher stated they were 
when the fan was run in its new position after moving up on the Sunday) was 
8.750 cubic feet per minute. but assuming the louvres were set at a slight angle 
and therefore not quite fully open the quantity capable of being circulated by 
the fan can be taken as about 8,000 cubic feet per minute. \Vhat was the 
quantity reaching this fan ? 
According to the evidence of McGregor. the total quantity of air entering 
the district, as measured in No, 3 heading at the air crossing averaged less 
than ]7,500 cubic feet per minute. This air passed up No. 3 heading to No. 2 
left thirl when it split, part of it going through that thirl into No. 2 heading 
where :\fo. I fan was situated and the remainder continuing up No. 3 heading. 
The No. I fan was of the same type and size as No. 3, but was said to be 
operated normally with the louvres set from half to three-quarters open ; thus 
it would be taking not less than 5,000 cubic feet per minute. This split 
returned down No. I heading where there was a regulator set (according to 
McGregor) to an orifice of approximately 20 square feet. It is apparent from 
the ventilation plan (No. 2) that some air would pass direct into the return 
additional to that taken by the fan, and this I assume to be about 500 cubic 
feet per minute making in all 5,500 cubic feet per minute circulating in that 
split. The quantity going fonvard up No. 3 heading to No, 2 fan would 
therefore be no more than 12,000 cubic feet per minute. 
No. 2 fan was capable of dealing with 5,000 cubic feet per minute. It will 
be recalled that when Hannah diverted the tubes for this fan from No. 5 right 
thirl to blow direct up No. 3 heading he opened the brattice sheet in that thirl 
(the opening being approximately 24 square feet). and the undennanager, 
deputy Hannah and other witnesses were agreed that with this opening-the 
regulator at the outbye end of No. 4 heading remained unchanged-the same 
quantity might be expected to return by No. 4 heading as would be circulated 
by the fan with the tubes in their normal position, i.e.> 5,000 cubic feet per 
minute. 
Thus the total quantity passing up No. 3 heading beyond No. 5 right thirl 
cannot have exceeded 7.000 cubic feet per minute even without allowing for 
leakages between the intake and return outbye of which there must have been 
some. The brattice sheet in No. 5 left thirl had been opened by Hannah in 
his early efforts to clear the accumulation of gas and later closed again after he 
had opened No, 6 left thirl, but it was probably not left very tight. In any 
event some leakage would occur here. 
t All this to my mind clearly establishes that the quantity of air reaching the 
No. 3 fan was insufficient for its requirements. 'Vhat the actual deficiency 
was can only be surmised, but it is of interest to note the estimate which the 
undermanager gave in reply to Mr. W. E. Jones as the quantity reaching the 
fan as follows :-
• 
Q. \Vhat amount of air would you consider would be passing along that 
road at that particular time ? Ha\'c you any estimate of the quantity of 
the air that would be available for ventilating that roadway ? 
A. 6,000 or 7,000 cubic feet as near as J can say at that time. 
Q. 6.000 or 7.000 cubic feet per minute at the time the cloth had been 
removed in S's thirl ? 
A. �o. 6 thirl. 
Q. XO, wait a bit. First of all, you have made prm'ision for circuiting 
the air into 4'5 return ? 
A. Yes. 
Q. To what extent would that reduce the quantity of air available for 
\'entilating the straight ? 
A. I t  would not reduce it any. 
Q. How do you come to that conclusion ? 
A. Because we had already got a blower fan at this point taking air from 
this main ventilation which was already going into �o_ 4 and there was no 
more ,-entiiation going through that point than what there would be when 
the fan was blowing. 
Q. \,"ould the normal " entilation passing along S's thirl into 4'S return 
not be in excess of that blo\\l1 into that particular area by the blower fan ? 
A. There would not be much variation in it ; very little. 
Q. And YOll come to the conclusion that normally, under ordinary 
circumstances when the blower fan was working you would have 6,000 or 
7,000 cubic feet of air passing inbye up the straight ? 
A. Yes. 
I consider e\'en the lower estimate of 6,000 cubic feet per minute most 
probably erred on the excessh'e side, but in any case the rtOmitlg of the fa" 
",'!IS bouml 1o result ilt re-circulatioll oflhe air. 
Mr. Graham placed the start of the " blast H in Ko. 3 heading just in beyond 
Ko. 5 left thirl and !\Ir. Hughes suspected the point of ignition to be between 
No. 4 left thirl and No. 5 left thirl, the force developing inbye (which agrees 
with my own view), but both went on to account for gas in this area by assuming 
that by some means (probably the falling down of the sheet unnoticed) No. 6 
left thirl became blocked, and the �o. 2 fan, the tubes from which they 
suggested had been extended up to or beyond that point, forced the gas back 
down No. 3 heading and fouled that road. 
If  the sheet in �o. 6 left thirl was closed (as seems to me likely) the more 
reasonable explanation is that it was closed deliberately by Hoodless or his 
men when No. 3 fan was started. The effect of running that fan would then 
be to draw air charged with firedamp from the return (No. 2 heading) through 
No. 5 left thirl, and possibly to a lesser extent through �o. 4 left thirl, into No. 3 
heading (and also to force gas back from the face down that heading) so 
creating just the conditions to produce the results which were afterwards found. 
That, 1 am !Satisfied, is what took place. 
Incidentally Mr. Graham spoke to evidence of the explosion having passed 
from No. 3 heading not only through No. 6 left thirl but also " through No. 5 
left thirl and thence down No. 2 heading to No. 4 left thirl where it was joined 
by violence, not excessive, which had come down No. 3 heading to that point 
and passed through :Ko_ 4 left thir!." The course of the explosion as thus 
described confirms my view that air containing gas was being circuJated between 
No. 4 left thirl and the No. 3 fan. 
Whether coal dust played any part at a later stage in the explosion it is very 
difficult to say. The workings at, and for some distance back from the face 




become drier, though still by no means dry, farther outbye. Mr . .\IcGregot 
stated that he regularly tested the roadways to see whether there \\-'as any 
dust which could be dispersed by blo\Vin� upon but could find none, and there­
fore no samples weTe coUeded for analysIs, and for this reason it appeared that 
no stone dust was applied. 
Samples were collected by l\'fr. Nussey on IIth December, though admittedly 
it was not easy to obtain them, and two of these taken in No. 3 heading-one 
between the 2nd and 3rd left thirls, and the other between the air crossing 
and the first right thirl-on analysis gave only 37.5 and 40.3 per cent. respec­
tively of incombustible matter. 
From the No. 3 left thiTl the explosion proceeded outbye chiefly by way of 
No. 2 heading, but to a lesser degree also down Nos. I and 3 headings until it 
reached No. I level at which point there was very considerable violence : the 
brickwork and door in ::\'0. 2 heading were blown out into No. 2 level, the air 
crossing at junction of No. t level and No. 3 heading was demolished, and the 
conveyor in No. 3 heading outbre of the air crossing was thrown about and badly 
damaged, the deputy's body being found in a mangled condition among the 
wreckage. There were also signs of fairly intensive heating at the outbye end 
of No. 3 heading and in Nos. I and 2 headings. 
It would appear, therefore, that more gas was picked up at about �o. 3 left 
thirl (probably from the old shuttle car workings), and to this I attribute most 
of the damage outbye, but I cannot with certainty rule out the possibility that 
alClng the lower part of �o. 3 heading the explosion was extended by coal du�t. 
One witness said he heard what appeared to be two ' bangs,' the first much 
more pronounced than the second ; if this be so, the first was probably the 
main explosion at the inbye end of No. 3 heading, and the second the demolition 
of the air crossing. 
Cause of the ACClmw/atio" of Firedamp-
The Management claimed that the ventilation arrangements were adequate 
and the evidence showed that up to the Sunday prior to the explosion no trouble 
had been experienced. They contended that the accumulation in this instance 
was due to the fall at the junction of No. 2 heading and No. 7 left thirl having 
occurred some time on the Sunday previous to Hannah's inspection, and that 
the closing of this connection, preventing the through circulation of air between 
the two advance headings, accounted for the accumulation. Evidence was 
given that additional water was raining from the roof at this spot making the 
strata slippery and tender, and that during the previous week extra supports 
had been set to strengthen the roof. Richard Norman, an overman, deposed 
that after the explosion, about the middle of January, he was instructed to 
make a special examination of the place to find out when the fall occurred. 
On the left side on the coal above the original roof he found a spattering of 
what he termed ' slush,' and alongside this faU standing up towards the coal 
was a prop the top of which also was spattered with mud. On this prop he 
also saw evidence of coking. From these he concluded that the spattering 
was caused by the explosion, and that the Call therefore occurred before the 
explosion. 
Mr. Price, who gave expert evidence for the owners, also said he had seen the 
spattering of mud-this was six or seven weeks after the explosion-and had 
I eached the same conclusion . 
On the other hand the undermanager saw this place on the Friday before the 
explosion ; it was then in order and he had no reason to anticipate further 
trouble there. Deputy Fisher also said that when he left the district on the 
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Sunday morning there was no fall at this junction, and no movement suggesting 
t hat a fall was likely. 
The first person to reach this junction after the explosion was Thomas 
Hodson, the captain of a rescue learn from Risehow Colliery which descended 
the mine at 4 o'clock on the Tuesday morning. He described the fall as 
pyramid shaped, the centre of which was right in the centre of the junction 
and tapering away in all directions. There was a space 18 inches high over 
the fall, but as he and his men were wearing apparatus they increased this by 
another foot by clearing away some of the stones, and they were then able to 
go up to the (ace of No. 2 heading and also through into the return outbye of 
the thiTl. 
By Commissioller-
Q. \Vould you conclude that there was a reasonable space for ventilation 
to go o\'er that fall and down back No, 2 heading ? 
A. At 18 inches high, sir, and your roadways were 6 to 7 feet high, i t  
would make the air sluggish. 
Q. J agree, if rou have a fall like that you ha\'e impeded your ventilation ; 
there is no question about that. 00 you still think there would be space to 
allow a reasonable quantity of air to pass ? 
A. There should be no gases collected on top of the fall. IS inches should 
allow quite sufficient air to get through. 
Mr. McCracken, the underrnanager, saw this fall on the night shift of the 
Tuesday-several others had passed over it in the meantime-and although 
the height over it varied he agreed that at the time of its occurrence it would 
average about 18 inches, and that would not cause a complete blockage of the 
yentilation. 
Even if the fall was a pre.explosion one, therefore, I am satisfied that it did 
not block the passage of air through No. 7 thirl, though it would reduce it. 
It was further suggested br the Agent,  and Mr. Price supported this, that the 
fall at this junction, consisting of about 3 feet of coal and 4 feet of stone, 
liberated firedamp which contributed to the accumulation. H this did occur 
it seems to indicate that the ventilation lacked any driving power to deal with 
it since at least part of the gas would be emitted into the return opposite to and 
on the outbye side of No. 7 thirl, which in any event would not be closed 
immediately and according to the e\'idence was not completelr closed after 
the explosion. 
11, my tll'ew the aCClfmlliation tt'as due chiefly, sf not entirely, to a natural 
emissioll from tlte seam m Nos. 2 mid 3 Iteadillgs wltich lite t'elltiiatio1J was in­
adequate to flleet wlten tlte auxiliary fans were standing. 
As stated on. page 6 deputies had reported some accumulation on previous 
occasions when an. auxiliary fan was stopped ; the underrnanager also said he 
had found gas occasionally " when the ventilation was disrupted " though not 
recently, and other witnesses agreed that when the fans were stopped gas 
might be expected to accumulate. That it was not reported more often 
following a stoppage was due no doubt to the practice of the deputy in each 
case starting the fan when he reached it, and leaving it  running some time 
before he made his inspection. 
These headings were being advanced at the rate of nearly 10 yards per week 
and were of large sectional area with coal roof and floor as well as sides, all of 
which might be expected to increase the emission of firedamp, Their large 
area, commendable on other grounds, had also the effect of reducing the air 
velocity, and as this was insufficient to turn the anemometer the quantity of 
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air passing was not measured. Moreover, it is more difficult to prevent firedamp 
accumulating in rising headings than in dipping or level ones, and a greater 
impact of fresh air is necessary to move an accumulation. There was no sudden 
fall of barometric pressure to account for the accumulation. 
1 cal/not escape the conc/us-iau that the ventilatioll had not kept pace with the 
rapid face adtlQllce, Qlld that the point had been reached where 'he qUQ1IWy of ai, 
rtachi"g the face, sufficient in the past, was inadequate la meet pr�ult needs. 
\"hile the No. 3 fan was kept running the ai.r would be kept in motion and, on 
the c,-idence, appeared to be in order (though some re-circulation was probably 
taking place), but when the fan stopped the air became sluggish and unable to 
prevent an accumulation-the headings it will be noted were some 40 yards 
in ad\'ance of the last thirling, In such circumstances the fan should have 
been kept running continuously and not stopped for lengthy periods at week­
ends. Moreover, steps should have been taken to increase the quantity of air 
in the general current in No. 3 heading reaching the fan, the capacity of which 
was unu ually large. The likelihood of re-circulation would be increased by 
the moving up of the fan on the Sunday since there was only sheet in No, 5 
left lhirl. 
If a fall did occur at No. 7 junction on the Sunday afternoon this would 
aggravate the position, but I feel sure the primary cause of the trouble was as 
stated abo\'e. 
\·.-OBSERVA T10:-.1S AND RECOMME:-.1DA T10:-lS 
As already stated the system of working in No. 2 district was Room and 
Pillar fully mechanised on American lines, entailing the use of a considerable 
quantity of electrically-driven machinery ("nth its switchgear and cables) for 
cutting. drilling. loading and conveying and (or ventilation. all at or in close 
proximity to the coal face. 
This system is now in use with satisfactory results as regards output at a 
number of collieries and is extending. \Vith such a quantity and variety of 
electrical apparatus in use it is apparent. in seams liable to give off firedamp 
even though not regarded as . .  gassy " in the accepted sense, that there is need 
for special precautions to ensure safety. 
I would call attention to a few of these, not that they are new but because 
they are of such vital importance as to require stre ing and the urgent con­
sideration of all concerned. 
(I) Tht first alld over-riding esse,llial is the provision and mailltello" ct at alt 
times of adequate ventilatio,J. The speed of advance made possible with thi 
method of working necessitates the careful planning ahead of ventilation 
requirements, and systematic checking of the ventilation by properly trained 
and competent officials. The use of auxiliary fans does not decrease this 
obligation but rather accentuates it, as is shown in the present case, 
Recommendations on the use of au..xiliary fans were made in my Report· 
on the Manvers Main Colliery Explosion, Yorkshire, and the Hanington 
Explosion emphasises their importance. 
One of the recommendations made in that report (page 26) has special 
significance in the present case, viz : . .  \\'hen a fan driven by electricity has 
been stopped for any length of time a careful inspection of the workings should 
be made before it is restarted ; if, however, gas is known to be likely to 
accumulate on stoppage the fan should be kept operating." 
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It is to be regretted that this was not observed at Harrington. 
]n my view the practice of the deputy starting up the fan after examining 
only at the fan, itself and lea\'ing it running for some time before inspecting the 
workings beyond is not satisfactory, since it may easily create a false impression 
as to the adequacy of the ventilation, as I belie\'c it did in this instance. 
Moreover, under such an arrangement, it is an easy, and perhaps not unnatural 
step-particularly if the inspection station is any considerable distance out bye 
-for the deputy to allow his men to pass beyond the station before he has 
completed the inspection of the whole of his district, contrary to Section 63 
of the Coal Mines Act, 191I. 
The Coal �lines (Ventilation) General Regulations 1947, recently made by 
you, to come into force on the 1St August, 1947 put some of these recommenda­
tions into effect. I consider these Regulations are urgently needed and their 
full implementation should not be delayed. 
(2) The electrical apparatus should not only be (as was the case here) of the 
highest standard and of certified flameproof type-or its equivalent where, and 
so long as, apparatus of American design and manufacture is in use-but special 
and COf/stallt alten/ion mllst be give1/. to its mai11tenallce in that cOlldition. 
This, of course, raises the question of supervision. 
Cnfortunately some weakness in this respect was revealed in the case under 
consideration, though in my view it had no bearing on the explosion. 
A maintenance engineer with electrical training and regarded as an assistant 
electrician was present on each shift as a member of the regular crew, and they 
appeared to be competent men with considerable experience in the types of 
apparatus in use ; but they had not for some time been receiving the necessary 
supervision and assistance of the expert electrical staff, partly owing to illness 
of the chief electrician but mainly through shortage of staff. 
Mr. Pattinson, the chief colliery electrician, had not himself visited the Xo. 
2 district for over a month prior to the explosion, and his assistant, who went 
underground at least once a week, last visited the district on 6th November 
when he accompanied Mr. A. A. Miller, the chief electrical engineer for the 
Company's Cumberland collieries. 
Mr. Pattinson's replies to my questions were as follows :­
Q. That was the 6th November ? 
A. Yes, in place of me. From memory I think that would be his last 
,·isit as well into that district. 
Q. Am [ right in assuming then that most of the electrical supervision in 
this district was left to these maintenance engineers ? 
A. There was a good deal of the supervision left entirely to those main­
tenance engineers, because 1 had every confidence that they were carrying 
out their duties perfectly. 
Q. SO I think it follows that a good deal-in fact, most of it-was left to 
the maintenance engineer. You say you had every confidence in them ? 
A. 1 had every confidence in them. 
Q. And possibly on that account you left more to them than you ought 
to have left ? 
A. Yes, although all the little troubles that we did have when I was 
available were always fully discussed. 
Q. Yes, I quite appreciate that when they were in trouble they sought 
your advice ? 
A. They did. 




Mr. Nimmo was asked by Mr. Stephenson whether he agreed that with this 
amount of electricity in use much morc careful handling was needed than with 
the old method, and said he did. On the question of electrical supervision he 
said there was a general shortage of competent electricians for mines, and they 
had suffered with other collieries ; if more men were available they certainty 
should be employed. It is to be hoped that efforts will be made to recruit and traill, 
more electricians as soo" as possible. 
In his remarks at the concluding stage of the Inquiry Mr. Stephenson, 
speaking on behalf of the National Union of Mineworkers as well as the 
Cumberland Miners' Association said " as an organisation we feel that now 
there is a good deal more of this power loading machinery going into the mines 
it is essential we should have more electrical inspectors on the Inspectorate " 
and he hoped the Ministry of Fuel and Power would consider the point. In 
1943 the strength of the electrical inspectorate staff was increased by the 
addition of four Juniors, but in recent months three experienced members of 
the staff have resigned to take up other appointments, seriously depleting its 
ranks. These vacancies will, I hope, be filled as quickly as possible so as to 
restore the Inspectorate to its full establishment. 
Although such Inspectors serve a very important and necessary purpose, the 
responsibility for the safe installation and daily upkeep of the electrical 
apparatus must of necessity rest upon the colliery staff who are in constant 
touch with the work being carried on. 
(3) One further point arises, viz :-the necessity for ensuring that electric cables 
and S".vitchgear 11ear the face call11Ot be made alive after a prolonged stoppage until 
the area in which they are situated has beelL examined by the deputy or other 
qualified official and he has certified it safe to do so. 
Under the system of remote control at Harrington it was possible in certain 
circumstances for the attendant in charge of the main belt at the transfer point 
outbye to switch current on to panels No. II and 19 and thereby to make alive 
switchgear and even to start scraper chain conveyors situated beyond the 
auxiliary fans controlling their ventilation. 
Tribute was justly paid by all parties at the Inquiry to the excellent work 
done by the Rescue Brigades and numerous others who voluntarily gave their 
services in an endeavour-unfortunately of no avail-to rescue the victims of 
the disaster, and later to recover the bodies. These efforts were in accord with 
the well-known high traditions of mining men, and I gladly record thanks to 
all who thus served. 
I have the honour to be, Sir, 
Your obedient Servant, 
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APPENDIX I 
LIST OF WITNESSES 
NAME 
John Steven Faulds 
Robert \Vilson Gallantry 
John Lewis Tubman 
John Proud Fisher 
Thomas Brown 
· . 
James \Villiam Glaister 
Robert O'Neill 
John McMullen 




. .  
· . 
· . 
Claude Bernard Meister Platt 
John McCracken 
Isaac Dixon McGregor 
John Charlton 
John \Villiam Forster 
Alfred Stephenson 
Edward Tinkler 
J oseph Pattinson 
Frederick Thomas Hindley 
Herbert Rainford 
Henry Robinson 





Richard Diamond Norman 
James Adam Nimmo 
Frank Graham 
Theodore James Hughes 
Alfred Alexander IHillar 

















Superintending Testing Officer 
Undermanager 
Training Officer 
Superintendent of Rescue Station 




H.M. Junior Electrical Inspector of Mines 
Testing Officer, Safety in i\'lines Research 
Board Testing Station 
Scientific Officer, Safety in Mines Re-
search Board 
H.i\L District Inspector of Mines 







Area Chief Electrical Engineer 
Consulting Mining Engineer 
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APPENDIX I I  
PARTICULARS OF PERSONS KILLED AND INJURED 
NAME 
f( illed 
1. \Villiam Hoadless 
Thomas Addison 
















. .  John Tolson Hill 
Daniel Largue 
\Villiam Henry Ennis 




Robert Maurice Bruney 
John Wright Bird 
Thomas Bird 
Thomas Austel Miller 
Injured 












































APPENDIX I I I  
EXAMINATION OF NO. 3 AEREX F.\N 
Subsequent to the joint inquest and inquiry into the causes and circumstances 
of the explosion which occurred at the Harrington No. 10 l\line on gth December, 
1946, the Commissioner, Sir John Felton, asked me to make a detailed examina­
tion of the above fan and the two broken belts, and consider whether the fan 
was running or stopped when the explosion occurred. 
I examined the fan at the S.l\LRB. Station, Buxton, on 14th, 19th and 20th 
March, 1947. with the following results :-
(r) This 478 mm.fr8.8 ins. DlA/n/M.P. Aerex Fan made by Walker Bros. 
(Wigan) Ltd., is fitted with a 3.5 ins. diameter pulley having grooves for si.x 
V-belts. The pulley is enclosed by a steel inlet fairing which is cut away on 
one side so that normally there is sufficient clearance for a drive of six V-belts 
from a 5.1 in. diameter pulley fitted to a IO h.p. electrically driven motor. 
Although provision had been made for six: V-belts, the pulleys contained 
only two belts in the second and third grooves respectively. (No. I groove is 
nearest to the fan, i.e. on the right-hand side of Plate 1.) But as two broken 
belts had been found in the bottom of the fan inlet after the explosion, it would 
appear that there were four belts on the pulleys prior to the explosion, and 
that these belts occupied Nos. 2, 3, 4 and 5 grooves (this was confirmed on 9th 
April, 1947 by Messrs. Millar and Pattinson, who said that the drive consisted 
of four belts in the above grooves). 
Each of the (our belts was of the same type (A.60) and had been supplied by 
F. Wigglesworth. The lengths of the two broken belts were 5 feet at inches 
and 5 feet ri inches, whereas the lengths of the two unbroken belts were 5 feet 
zt inches and 5 feet z� inches. The former belts were much darker in colour 
than the latter and may not have been out of the same batch or put on at the 
same time. 
PLATE 1. View of part of damaged fairing, fan pulley and the two belts in 
Nos. 2 and 3 grooves. 
PLATE 2. View of ends of the two broken belts which occupied Nos. 4 and 
5 grooves prior to the explosion. 
(2) The steel inlet lairing had been so damaged and displaced that it did 
not provide sufficient clearance for a drive of six V-belts ; Plate 3 shows that 
it was impossible to put belts in the sixth and fifth grooves. It was possible 
to put a belt in the fourth groove, as shown in Plate 4, and it will be noted that 
the fairing is touching and slightly deflecting the belt, but this did not prevent 
the fan from being run with a slight scraping noise. Although I feel it was 
improbable, but not entirely impossible, for the damaged fairing to cut the 
belt in the fifth groove if the fan was stopped, I consider Plate 4 shows quite 
conclusively that it was impossible for the fairing to cut or cause the belt in 
the fourth groove to be broken if the fan was stopped. 
In my opinion the two belts in the fifth and fourth grooves respectively 
were broken when the fairing was damaged and forced inwards while the fan 
was rotating at a speed sufficiently high to induce an excessive pull in the 
belts at the instant they were subject to interference and nipping on the slack 
side. 
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